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ABSTRACT 
Fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court in In re Gault held 
that children have the constitutional right to traditional counsel in cases 
where their physical liberty interests are at stake. As a result, children are 
provided counsel during the adjudication phase of delinquency 
proceedings in order to ensure protection of their rights. Gault did not, 
however, extend the automatic right to traditional counsel to other 
contexts in which children most frequently appear in court: family law 
cases. 
This Article explores whether a child’s right to traditional counsel 
should be extended to children in the private custody context. The article 
reviews cases that have explicitly expanded children’s rights since Gault, 
both children’s cases expanding their rights in various contexts and 
adults’ cases with implications for children in the family context. In 
addition, it reviews current inconsistencies in practice, rules and 
standards related to children’s attorneys. It concludes that children’s 
constitutional rights require traditional client-directed advocacy by 
attorneys in custody matters, and recommends a role of counsel that 
protects constitutional rights while ensuring consistent and ethical 
advocacy by children’s attorneys. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for 
adults alone.1 
[I]t seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and 
families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such 
intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these interests. . . .2 
 
Fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court decided In re 
Gault, the most important case related to the right to counsel for 
children in the United States.3 In Gault, the Court held that children 
whose physical liberty interests are at stake in delinquency proceedings 
have an affirmative right to counsel.4 As a result, children in the 
adjudication phase of delinquency proceedings are provided not just 
counsel, but traditional counsel – lawyers required to act as “client-
directed” or “expressed wishes” attorneys.5 Gault, however, separated 
the delinquency context from other contexts in which children 
frequently appear in court – in particular child protection and child 
custody matters6 – and the Supreme Court has never addressed 
whether children have the right to traditional counsel in these contexts. 
Courts and parents’ advocates often express concern about 
expanding children’s right to counsel in the family context, given 
current limits on children’s legal status and the practical challenges 
related to competing rights within families. Changes in law and practice 
since Gault, however, show movement in that direction. Since Gault, 
children’s substantive legal rights7 and access to counsel have expanded 
 
 1.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 1 (1967). 
 2.  Troxel v. Granville 530 U.S. 57, 86−88 (2000) (Stevens, dissent). 
 3.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 1. 
 4.  Id. at 60 (Black, J., concurring). 
 5.  Id. at 36. The right to counsel in these proceedings is not uniform. Across jurisdictions, 
attorneys are often confused about their roles, even in delinquency proceedings, and are not 
always appointed at every stage in the proceeding. See ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., A CALL 
FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN 
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2002), http://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/A-Call-for-
Justice_An-Assessment-of-Access-to-Counsel-and-Quality-of-Representation-in-Delinquency-
Proceedings.pdf; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-221(A) (2010) (appointing counsel only if the 
offense can result in detention); cf. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419C.200 (2003) (requiring court to 
appoint counsel to a child in any case where it would be required to appoint counsel to an adult 
charged with the same offense). 
 6.  Gault, 387 U.S. at 49. 
 7.  While nineteen other countries have adopted the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, the United States has not done so; therefore, children’s rights have not been 
articulated within a single framework in the United States. The bases for expanded children’s 
rights in the United States are discussed in Section II, infra. 
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significantly.8 As discussed in Section I, children are now frequently 
represented in a variety of legal matters9 by advocates serving in a 
variety of roles, based on best interests,10 the right to be heard,11 a 
delineated right to counsel,12 or some unarticulated reason. The 
substantive legal basis for and the purpose of the representation is 
often vague in practice outside the delinquency context13 and attorneys’ 
roles and ethical duties are often muddled in other matters.14 
Without the obligation to serve as traditional client-directed 
counsel as is constitutionally mandated in delinquency matters,15 
children’s attorneys in custody, visitation and other private family 
matters – serving in such roles as guardian ad litem (GAL), best 
interests attorney, and child representative16 – are often allowed (and 
even in some circumstances required)17 to obstruct their own clients’ 
rights and interests.18 This Article explores whether the right to 
traditional “client-directed” or “expressed-wishes”19 counsel should be 
extended to children in the custody context. It takes the position 
 
 8.  See Howard A. Davidson, Children’s Rights and American Law: A Response to What’s 
Wrong With Children’s Rights, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 69, 70–72 (2006). 
 9.  See, e.g., In re H.R.C., 781 N.W.2d 105, 115 (Mich. App. 2009) (finding the child’s 
attorney in dependency and termination of parental rights case owed duties to child); Michael H. 
v. April H., 934 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2011) (appointing expressed wishes attorney in 
child custody).  
 10.  See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/506(a)(3) (2016) (duties of child representative in 
Illinois child custody cases).  
 11.  For an excellent discussion of the importance of child voice in custody proceedings, see 
generally Melissa L. Breger, Against the Dilution of a Child’s Voice in Court, 20 IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 175 (2010). 
 12.  See, e.g., In re Jamie TT, 599 N.Y.S.2d 892, 894 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (finding a child 
constitutionally entitled to counsel in fact-finding dependency hearing).  
 13.  Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need for Counsel for Children in Custody, 
Visitation and Child Protection Proceedings, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L. REV. 299, 305 (1998).  
 14.  Morgan v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94, 115–16 (Ky. 2014) (holding that a guardian ad litem 
needs to be an advocate, representative, and agent of the child, and the guardian ad litem should 
assume the role of a “best interest” attorney, not an “expressed interest” attorney).  
 15.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967). 
 16.  See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/506(a)(3) (2016). 
 17.  See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE CTS., RESPONSIBILITIES OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM, 
http://courts.ky.gov/courtprograms/Documents/P84ResponsibilitiesofaGALsheet.pdf (August 
2014) (“A GAL should advocate the child’s best interests, but advise the court when the child 
disagrees with the attorney’s assessment of the case.”). 
 18.  Id.   
 19.  See NAT’L ASS’N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, ABA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR 
LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES, Standard IV(C) 
(NACC Revised Version 2011) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS] (“The Child’s Attorney should 
abide by the client’s decisions about the objectives of the representation with respect to each issue 
on which the child is competent to direct the lawyer, and does so. The Child’s Attorney should 
pursue the child’s expressed objectives, unless the child requests otherwise, and follow the child’s 
direction through the case.”). 
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ultimately that children’s constitutional rights require traditional 
client-directed advocacy in custody matters, meaning that children 
should be represented by attorneys providing traditional functions, 
following client directives and advocating for their client’s positions in 
the same manner as any other attorney. Part I describes the history of 
children’s legal rights and status in the United States. Part II describes 
In re Gault and its potential implications for advocacy on behalf of 
children across contexts. Part III compares the current roles that 
children’s attorneys play nationally across contexts. Part IV describes 
current inconsistencies in the appointment and role of counsel for 
children in child custody matters. Part V examines constitutional 
rationales for providing children traditional counsel in custody matters 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Part VI argues that 
children’s rights require traditional advocacy in private custody 
matters. Part VII recommends how states may define the role of 
counsel for children in custody matters in a manner that acknowledges 
child status, protects children’s constitutional rights, and allows 
attorneys to follow the traditional rules of professional conduct, thus 
promoting appropriate and ethical advocacy. 
I.  BASIS FOR CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND STATUS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
The Constitution does not reference children or their relationship 
to their families.20 Historically, it was assumed that children did not 
need legal rights or status based on the idea that children were the 
property of their parents and parental authority was sufficient to 
protect children’s interests.21 Still, in the early 1800s, courts began to 
allow the state to intervene in matters involving children where the 
parents were unable or unwilling to protect their children’s interests 
under the doctrine of parens patriae.22 
 
 20.  Homer H. Clarke Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1992) 
(“[T]here is nothing in the Constitution about children, minors or infants, or parents for that 
matter. So far as I have been able to determine, none of those subjects appears in the records or 
debates leading to the drafting and ratification of the Constitution.”); Linda D. Elrod, Client-
Directed Lawyers for Children: It Is the “Right” Thing to Do, 27 PACE L. REV. 869, 876 (2007) 
(“The Constitution is silent on rights for children or their families and the United States Supreme 
Court has been reluctant to enumerate substantive rights for children.”). 
 21.  See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606 (1979) (holding that State procedures for 
admitting a child for treatment to a state mental hospital were not unconstitutional because 
Georgia’s medical fact-finding processes were consistent with constitutional guarantees and that 
children have due process rights when being committed to mental institutions).   
 22.  Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The right held by the court 
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Seminal U.S. Supreme Court decisions illustrate children’s legal 
status in the early twentieth century, affirming the notion that 
children’s constitutional rights were subsumed in their parents’ rights, 
or, if the parents were unfit, to the state’s rights. These early cases pitted 
the state’s interest in protecting children’s wellbeing against the rights 
of parents to raise children and control their upbringing. In Meyer v. 
Nebraska, for example, the Court considered a state statute that 
prohibited schools from teaching children in a language other than 
English.23 The Court noted that a parent’s right to “establish a home 
and bring up children” is a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.24 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, parents challenged a state 
statute that required students to attend public schools rather than 
parochial schools.25 In overturning the statute as unconstitutional, the 
Court noted that children “are not mere creature[s] of the state,” but 
its rationale was based on the parents’ rights, not the child’s: “[W]e 
think it entirely plain that the [statute] unreasonably interferes with the 
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education 
of children under their control.”26 However, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 
the Court upheld the conviction of a guardian who violated child labor 
laws by forcing a niece under her guardianship to distribute Jehovah’s 
Witness pamphlets.27 The Court reiterated its former position that “the 
custody, care, and nurture of the child resides first in the parents,” but 
added that “[a]cting to guard the general interest in youth’s wellbeing, 
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control.”28 
Scholars have discussed that early children’s rights cases came 
about in the context of the “child saving”29 movement and the creation  
 
to make a reasonable decision on the part of a person who is unable to make one for himself. 
Usually, such people suffer from disabilities, rendering it impossible for them to make the right 
decision. 
 23.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397 (1925).  
 24.  Id. at 399. 
 25.  Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 530–31 
(1925). 
 26.  Id. at 535–36. 
 27.  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 160, 171 (1944). 
 28.  Id. at 166. 
 29.  See WILLIAM AYERS, A KIND AND JUST PARENT 25–26 (1997) (“The ‘child-saving’ 
societies [of the Protest and Catholic Churches] . . . strove to take children from ‘unfit’ or destitute 
homes, places where youngsters were ‘neglected’ or ‘morally corrupted,’ and find a foster home 
(preferably on a farm) or an institution where children could be raised up to be ‘moral,” “‘fully 
participating members of society.’ Large numbers of children, particularly immigrant children 
from Catholic countries like Italy and Ireland, found themselves literally swept off the streets and  
ensnared in the legal system, either as delinquents or paupers, forced from their families and 
shipped away ‘for their own good.’”). 
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of juvenile courts.30 The first juvenile court was founded in Chicago in 
1899 and almost every state followed over the next twenty years.31 
Juvenile courts had jurisdiction over delinquent and dependent 
children and were considered “an especially kind tribunal, which would 
care for children . . . as the parens patriae.”32 The courts “operated . . . as 
largely process-less tribunals, attempting to do what was best.”33 
Children were not given the kind of rights that we now think of as 
necessary to ensure due process – for example, the right to notice, to be 
heard, or to counsel – because these types of rights were considered 
disruptive and non-essential by the authorities who operated the courts 
and “felt they knew what was best for disadvantaged children and 
could implement it through a judicial process that did not require 
procedural safeguards for the child.”34 
Without articulated individual rights to assert, children did not have 
autonomy within delinquency or dependency proceedings in juvenile 
courts and were subject to the whims and judgment of the court as a 
substitute “kind and just parent.”35 Courts operated in a generally due-
process-free manner for more than half a century until In re Gault36 
appeared before the Court fifty years ago. In Gault, as detailed below, 
the Court considered the informal juvenile court process that existed 
in the first half of the twentieth century.37 There, a minor was before the 
court for making prank phone calls.38 He was determined to be 
delinquent and sentenced to removal from his home without ever 
standing trial or receiving advocacy by an attorney.39 Gault alleged that 
the juvenile court process violated his constitutional rights.40 The Court 
agreed,  holding  that  children  are  individuals who possess their own  
 
 
 30.  See In re M.I.S., No. 41000–8–I., 1999 WL 325442 at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. May 24, 1999) 
(“The philosophy of the child-saving movement and the court’s expanding grounds for family 
intervention were finally codified in 1899 when the first juvenile court was created in Cook 
County, Illinois. The model was quickly followed in other states.”). 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Marvin Ventrell, The Practice of Law for Children, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 75, 
86−88 (2006). 
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Ayers, supra note 29, at 24. 
 36.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 1 (1967). 
 37.  See generally id. 
 38.  Id. at 4. 
 39.  Id. at 7–8. 
 40.  Id. at 9–10. 
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constitutional rights specifically delineated in the Bill of Rights and 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.41 
While children’s attorneys often argue that children should be 
afforded the same rights as adults,42 parents’ attorneys frequently note 
children’s different historically-recognized legal status as a reason not 
to extend adult constitutional rights to children.43 The Court has held 
that children’s constitutional rights are not automatically equated to 
adult’s rights due to children’s developmental status,44 but since Gault 
the Court has recognized, alluded to, or expanded children’s 
constitutional rights in a variety of cases. 
Since Gault, the Supreme Court has addressed children’s 
substantive rights based on the First and Fourteenth Amendment 
numerous times and has made it clear that children have fundamental 
rights that are entitled to the protection of the law.45 When addressing 
children’s rights under the First Amendment in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the 
Court reiterated its position from Gault: children are considered 
persons within the meaning of the Bill of Rights.46 In Tinker v. Des 
Moines, the Court held that children have First Amendment free 
speech rights that are not surrendered at the schoolhouse door.47 In 
 
 41.  Id. at 13. 
 42.  See, e.g., Elrod, supra note 20.  
 43.  MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (2005); see also 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988) (“We assume that [children] do not yet act 
as adults do, and thus we act in their interest by restricting certain choices that we feel they are 
not yet ready to make with full benefit of the costs and benefits attending such decisions.”). 
 44.  See, e.g., Thompson, 487 U.S. at. 825 n.23.   
 45.  In addition to these cases, there are several other areas where children’s rights have been 
articulated or expanded. See, e.g., Vivian E. Hamilton, The Age of Marital Capacity: 
Reconsidering Civil Recognition of Adolescent Marriage, 92 B.U.L. REV. 1817 (2012) (discussing 
parental consent, judicial bypass and pregnancy as means for minors to marry and highlighting 
Georgia’s procedure for appointing a guardian ad litem pursuant to N.C.S.A. § 51-2.1(b)); Carol 
Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modern Times, 25 U. 
MICH. J. L. REF. 239 (1992) (discussing categories of emancipated minors and states that allow 
for appointment of counsel for the child); Luke Hudock, Deference to Duplicity: Wisconsin’s 
Recognition of the Mature Minor Doctrine, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 973 (2014); Doriane Lambelet 
Coleman & Phillip M. Rosoff, The Legal Authority of Mature Minors to Consent to General 
Medical Treatment, 131 PEDIATRICS 786 (2013); Sarah J. Baldwin, Choosing a Home: When 
Should Children Make Autonomous Choices About their Home Life?, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. Rev. 503 
(2013) (discussing mature minor doctrine and emancipation); S.C. v. Guardian Ad Litem, 845 
So.2d 953, 957 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that a minor child has the right to assert 
psychotherapist-patient privilege). 
 46.  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (finding that the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments prevent a state from compelling Amish parents to cause their children, who have 
graduated from the eighth grade, to attend formal high school to age 16). 
 47.  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). But see 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272–73 (1988) (allowing a principal to censor 
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addition, the Court has spoken several times to children’s First 
Amendment rights to personal autonomy. In Belotti v. Baird,48 Carey v. 
Population Services International,49 and Planned Parenthood v. 
Danforth,50 the Court acknowledged minors’ reproductive rights. In 
Belotti, the court held that the state could not infringe upon a minor’s 
right to seek abortion without parental consent without a judicial 
determination of whether the minor was sufficiently mature to make 
the decision.51 Because a fundamental interest was at stake, the minor 
had a right to be heard.52 
In addition to the First Amendment, the Court has extended the 
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment – both due process and 
equal protection – to children in a variety of cases. The idea that 
children may assert the right to notice, to be heard, and the other 
protections typically associated with basic due process has by now been 
established and followed in various settings outside the delinquency 
context. For example, in Parham v. J.R., the Court held that children 
have due process rights when being committed to mental institutions.53 
In Goss v. Lopez, the Court held that children have due process rights 
before being expelled from school.54 In Ingham v. Wright, the Court 
held that a child has due process rights prior to being subjected to 
corporal punishment in school.55 The Court has also allowed Equal 
Protection challenges brought by minors. For example, in Stanton v. 
 
school magazine); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986) (allowing school 
to regulate offensive speech). 
 48.  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (holding that a minor has the right to seek 
judicial consent for abortion). 
 49.  Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 n.14, 694 (1977) (holding that a minor 
has the right to access contraceptives, and noting that minors are entitled to constitutional 
protections for speech, equal protection against racial discrimination, due process in civil matters, 
and the rights of a defendant in delinquency matters). 
 50.  Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (finding that a 
minor has the right to seek elective abortion). 
 51.  Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647. 
 52.  Id.  
 53.  See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606 (1979) (holding that the State’s procedures for 
admitting a child for treatment to a state mental hospital were not unconstitutional because 
Georgia’s medical fact finding processes were consistent with constitutional guarantees and that 
when being committed to mental institutions, children have due process rights).  
 54.  See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580–81 (1975) (holding that students facing temporary 
suspension from public school were entitled to protection under the due process clause and that 
due process required, in connection with suspensions of up to ten days, that such a student be 
given notice of charges and an opportunity to present his version to authorities, preferably prior 
to removal from school, but there were instances in which prior notice and hearing were not 
feasible and the immediately removed student should be given necessary notice of hearing as soon 
as practicable).  
 55.  Ingham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).  
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Stanton56 and Craig v. Boren,57 the Court allowed equal protection 
challenges brought by minors to age and gender restrictions.58 In Plyler 
v. Doe, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause 
applied to immigrant schoolchildren who were denied an education.59 
Despite substantive legal advances and expanded status in many 
contexts, children’s rights within the family context remain less clear. 
The Supreme Court has not had many opportunities to address 
children’s First and Fourteenth Amendment children’s right to family 
relationships, mostly because cases in the family context are typically 
brought by parents asserting their own rights or the state asserting 
rights over a child under the docrtrine of parens partiae.60 Therefore, we 
are left to review the decisions of lower courts, which have more 
frequently addressed the issue of children’s First Amendment 
relational rights within the family61 – whether the constitutional right 
to the parent-child relationship afforded to parents must also be 
directly afforded to children – and some have addressed what means 
are constitutionally necessary to protect children’s relational rights.62 
Children’s relational rights as constitutionally-protected rights, and as 
a basis for the child’s right to a traditional attorney, is discussed in 
Section V. In order to expand children’s right to traditional counsel in 
custody cases, the Court would have to entertain a challenge similar to 
the one in Gault, discussed in the next Section. 
II.  GAULT AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS ACROSS CONTEXTS 
Gault, the seminal right-to-counsel children’s case began over fifty 
years ago. In June of 1964, minor Gerald Gault was taken into custody 
on complaint that he had made an “irritatingly offensive, adolescent 
 
 56.  See 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975) (holding that the difference in sex between children did not 
warrant a distinction in the Utah statute under which girls attained majority at 18 but boys did 
not attain majority until they were 21 years of age, and the statute could not, under any test, 
survive an attack based on equal protection).  
 57.  See 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that an Oklahoma Statute that prohibited the sale of 
“non-intoxicating” 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 
constituted a denial of the equal protection of the laws to males aged 18-20).  
 58.  Id.  
 59.  See Plyer v. Doe 457 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1982). The Supreme Court had previously applied 
the Equal Protection clause in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954), which 
held that racially segregated schools deprived black children of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of equal protection of laws.  
 60.  See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159–60 (1944). 
 61.  See, e.g., Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 821 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 62.  See, e.g., Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 524 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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and of the sex variety” phone call to his neighbor, Ora Cook.63 When 
Gault was finally released to his mother, the superintendent of the 
Detention Home gave Gault’s mother a note stating, “Judge McGhee 
has set Monday June 15, 1964 at 11:00 A. M. as the date and time for 
further hearings on Gerald’s delinquency.”64 At the hearing, the judge 
ordered that Gault be confined to the State Industrial School “for the 
period of his minority, unless sooner discharged by due process of 
law.”65 Gault’s accuser was not present at either hearing because the 
judge determined it was not necessary for her to be present.66 Gault’s 
parents petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for a writ of habeas 
corpus for Gault’s release, but the petition was dismissed.67 Gault’s 
parents appealed to the United States Supreme Court.68 The Court held 
that “absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency, and an 
order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the 
absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-
examination in accordance with our law and constitutional 
requirements,” and reversed and remanded the case.69 
Since Gault, children in delinquency proceedings have the right to 
be assisted by traditional client-directed counsel.70 This right is rooted 
in the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.71 The protections 
afforded to children include the right to notice, confrontation, counsel, 
and to avoid self-incrimination.72 The Court in Gault noted that “a 
proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be 
‘delinquent’ and subjected to the loss of liberty for years is comparable 
in seriousness to a felony prosecution.”73 Because a liberty interest was 
at stake – physical removal from the family and placement in an 
institution – the Court rooted the right to counsel in the due process 
clause and explicitly rejected the idea that a parent, probation officer 
or judge could be relied upon to protect a child’s interests in a 
delinquency proceeding.74 Children were thus acknowledged as rights-
 
 63.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 5 (1967). 
 64.  Id. at 6. 
 65.  Id. at 7. 
 66.  Id. at 5. 
 67.  Id. at 8. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 56. 
 70.  Id. at 36. 
 71.  Id.  
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id.  
 74.  Id. (“The probation officer cannot act as counsel for the child. His role in the 
adjudicatory hearing, by statute and in fact, is as arresting officer and witness against the child. 
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based persons under the Constitution: “[N]either the Fourteenth 
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”75 
III.  ROLE OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN ACROSS CONTEXTS 
Children are involved in a variety of legal proceedings, either as 
parties or as people with an interest in the outcome of the litigation. 
Children are represented in these proceedings in a variety of ways by 
advocates serving in a variety of roles that include traditional attorney 
and non-traditional advocacy roles. Advocates are typically appointed 
in cases where parents or guardians cannot be relied on to protect the 
child’s interests, for example: minors seeking emancipation from 
parents,76 minors seeking judicial consent to marry,77 minors seeking 
judicial consent to seek abortion,78 minors asserting mature minor right 
to make medical decisions,79 psychiatric confinement,80 and minors 
participating in probate or other financial matters where the parent 
may have a competing interest in the property.81 
These are not, however, the only cases where children appear 
before the court. Children also appear before the court in matters 
including delinquency, child protection, paternity, adoption and private 
custody matters. Because of Gault, children in delinquency proceedings 
now have the right to a traditional attorney during adjudication 
proceedings and the full extent of the rights and privileges that the 
attorney-client relationship creates.82 The right to a traditional attorney 
 
Nor can the judge represent the child. There is no material difference in this respect between 
adult and juvenile proceedings of the sort here involved. In adult proceedings, this contention has 
been foreclosed by the Court.”). 
 75.  Id. at 13. 
 76.  See, e.g., In re Kevin B., No. HHDFA990721554, 2010 WL 1508468 (Conn. Super. Mar. 
9, 2010). 
 77.  See, e.g., In re King, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 533 (Pa. Orph. 1958). 
 78.  See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 624 (1979). 
 79.  See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 323 (Ill. 1989). 
 80.  Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606 (1979) (requiring that children subject to mental 
commitment be afforded an independent inquiry by a neutral factfinder, but not requiring the 
appointment of independent counsel). 
 81.  Williams v. Briggs, 502 P.2d 245, 248 (Or. 1972). 
 82. See Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the 
Role of Child’s Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (2005). Henning 
notes: 
Notwithstanding the initial debate, by the early 1980s a consensus seems to have 
evolved among academic commentators and professional leaders in the juvenile justice 
community regarding the appropriate role of counsel in delinquency cases. The 
professional leadership as represented by the OJJDP, the ABA, and the Institute of 
Judicial Administration (IJA) issues a series of standards to govern the administration 
of justice for children charged with crimes. These standards uniformly endorsed an 
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is now “uniformly endorsed” in juvenile justice matters.83 Gault did not, 
however, extend an affirmative right to a client-directed attorney to 
other court contexts.84 
In child protection matters85 involving allegations of abuse and 
neglect, children are provided a representative to protect their best 
interests.86 The current version of the federal Child Abuse Prevention 
and Treatment Act87 requires that children in such proceedings be 
appointed a trained individual to advocate for the child – an attorney 
or a court-appointed special advocate – tasked with understanding the 
child’s needs and situation, and making recommendations to the court 
concerning the child’s best interests.88 States vary considerably in these 
matters: some provide guardians ad litem, some traditional attorneys, 
some hybrid roles, and some non-attorney advocates.89 
Under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), a child may bring a 
paternity action through his or her mother or guardian.90 In some states, 
if paternity is contested, the child is appointed a guardian ad litem to 
 
expressed-interest, adversarial model of representation for children at all phases of the 
delinquency case. . . . Today, even where disagreement persists among scholars over the 
role of counsel in abuse and neglect and other child-related proceedings, the weight of 
academic opinion now firmly supports the expressed-interest adversary model of 
advocacy in delinquency cases. 
Id. at 255–56. 
 83.  Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (balancing the rights 
of a parent to the custody and control of her child with the minor’s right to obtain an abortion, 
such that the minor’s rights outweighed the parent’s: “Constitutional rights do not mature and 
come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well 
as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights”).  
 84.  See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (“We do not in this opinion consider the impact of 
these constitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship between the juvenile and the 
state.”). 
 85.  While the child’s right to client-directed counsel in dependency, abuse and neglect cases 
is outside the scope of this article, there are many articles on this subject. See, e.g., LaShanda 
Taylor, A Lawyer for Every Child: Client-Directed Representation in Dependency Cases, 47 FAM. 
CT. REV. 605, 606 (2009); Elrod, supra note 20; Erik Pitchal, Children’s Constitutional Right to 
Counsel in Dependency Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 663 (2006); Jacob Ethan Smiles, 
A Child’s Due Process Right to Legal Counsel in Abuse and Neglect Dependency Proceedings, 37 
FAM. L. Q. 485, 490 n.36 (2003).   
 86.  See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. 1340.14(g) (1994) (requiring appointment of a guardian ad litem for 
abused or neglected children in judicial proceedings, pursuant to the Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5101-5118)). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  FIRST STAR & CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY INST., A CHILD’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A 
NAT’L REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 
(2009), https://www.firststar.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Final_RTC_2nd_Editio n .pdf. 
 90.  MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.826 (2009).  
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represent the child’s best interests.91 After the child reaches the age of 
majority, he or she may assert parentage rights through independent 
counsel.92 
Likewise, states frequently lay out the age at which a child must 
consent to an adoption.93 If the child contests the adoption, he or she 
may contest the adoption, but courts have the ability to waive the 
child’s consent after a hearing.94 Counsel or a guardian ad litem is 
appointed on a discretionary basis in these matters, in particular in 
contested matters where the suitability of the adoptive placement is 
questioned or where the child’s best interests are otherwise at issue.95 
However, in private custody matters – cases involving custody 
disputes within intact families – children (like parents) are not 
automatically afforded counsel.96 When counsel is hired or appointed, 
that counsel may play a variety of roles, as outlined below. 97 
IV.  APPOINTMENT AND ROLE OF COUNSEL IN CUSTODY MATTERS  
Without a constitutional mandate requiring the appointment of 
traditional client-directed counsel in custody matters, practices vary 
widely between jurisdictions. Rather than operating within a children’s 
rights-based framework, custody matters are most often framed within 
a best-interests-of-the-child scheme. Within that framework, the child’s 
wishes are to be considered when making custody determinations, but 
are not dispositive.98 Under the Uniform Marriage and Dissolution Act 
 
 91.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7700-612 (2006). 
 92.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.05 (1982) (a paternity action may be filed within five 
years of reaching the age of majority). 
 93.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106A (2014) (requiring consent of child 12 and 
above for adoption). 
 94.  S.J. ex rel. M.W. v. W.L., 755 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 4th Dist. App. 2000). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  In re Rosier-Lemmon/Rosier Children, No. 2003 CA 00306, 2004 WL 540299, at ¶ 22 
(Ohio Ct. App.). (“There is no constitutional right, however, to effective representation by 
counsel in civil cases between individual parents involving visitation and residential-parent 
status.”). 
 97.  For articles generally addressing standards for child representation in custody matters, 
see Barbara Atwood, Representing Children Who Can’t or Won’t Direct Counsel: Best Interest 
Lawyering or No Lawyering at All?, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 381 (2011); Melissa L. Breger, Against the 
Dissolution of the Child’s Voice in Court, 20 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 175 (2011); Martin 
Guggenheim, The AAML’s Revised Standards for Representing Children in Custody and 
Visitation Proceedings: The Reporter’s Perspective, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 251 (2009); 
James C. May, Lawyering for Children in High Conflict Cases, 33 VT. L. REV. 169 (2008); Barbara 
Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ 
Rights, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 313 (1998).  
 98.  In re Hartley, 886 P.2d. 665 (Colo. 1994). 
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(UMDA), courts are frequently not required to appoint advocates for 
children at all, let alone traditional client-directed attorneys.99 While 
many children’s rights scholars and attorneys take the position that 
children should have client-directed counsel in custody matters,100 
many legislatures, professional organizations, and parents’ attorneys 
have not moved in that direction. As such, there is inconsistency in 
practice that affects children’s ability to be heard or effectively advance 
their rights and interests. 
A.  Best Interests of the Child Framework 
Custody and related matters are determined within the best 
interests of the child framework.101 The standard has been uniformly 
adopted in private custody matters via the UMDA, which states:102 
§ 402. [Best Interest of Child] 
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best 
interest of the child.  The court shall consider all relevant factors 
including: 
 (1) the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his custody; 
 (2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian; 
 (3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his 
parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may 
significantly affect the child’s best interest; 
 (4) the child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community; 
and 
 (5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved. 
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that 
does not affect his relationship to the child. 
Pursuant to the UMDA, the parties’ and the child’s wishes are 
factors103 for the court to consider in determining the child’s best 
interests, but are not dispositive.104 The trial court does not determine 
parental fitness in private custody matters, but instead balances the best 
interest factors. Judges are allowed, but not required, to appoint a 
 
 99.  See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.070 (1989) (“The court may appoint an 
attorney to represent the interests of a minor or dependent child with respect to custody, support, 
and visitation.”). 
 100.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 101.  UNIFORM MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 1973).   
 102.  Id. § 402. 
 103.  See Sarah J. Baldwin, Choosing a Home: When Should Children Make Autonomous 
Choices About Their Home Life?, 46 SUFFOLK L. REV. 503 (2013) (discussing the disparities in 
state laws regarding child’s preferences). 
 104.  In re Hartley, 886 P.2d. 665 (Colo. 1994). 
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lawyer for the child based on the application of the factors.105 
Commentators have questioned the appropriateness of the standard, 
calling it “a formula for unleashing state power, without any 
meaningful reassurance of advancing children’s interests.”106 
The best interest framework is rooted in the presumption that 
parents act in the best interests of the child, which dates all the way 
back to Meyer v. Nebraska in 1925 and was addressed by the Supreme 
Court in the private custody/visitation context as recently as Troxel v. 
Granville in 2000. Where parents are deemed to be “fit,” they are 
shielded from state examination by the veil of parental privacy.107 One 
problem with the best interests approach is that it presumes that 
parents will act in the interests of their children, which is not always the 
case.108 Some courts have addressed the issue of whether the child’s 
fundamental right to family relations is advanced and protected by the 
best interests of the child. For example, in Hiller v. Fausey, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Pennsylvania Grandparent Visitation Act.109 In a separate concurrence, 
Justice Newman advocated for fundamental rights protections to be 
applied to the child’s best interests in making a custody determination: 
I advocate that we finally legitimize the right of the child to have his 
or her best interests considered as a fundamental right. The interest 
is expressed in a variety of statutes and proceedings, ranging from 
complete severance of parental rights on a judge’s finding of 
parental unfitness [in a termination proceeding], to the limitation of 
parental choices in the areas, for example, of education, health care, 
and safety.  Thus, I believe that the instant matter involves a 
situation that burdens two fundamental rights – the right of a fit 
father to make parenting decisions for the child and the right of the 
child to have its best interests considered . . . If balancing of interests 
is necessary, the interests of the child must prevail.110 
This position is fairly unusual. Despite the fact that the child’s 
wishes are to be considered by the court when making a best interests 
determination, in practice custody proceedings frequently focus on the 
parents’ competing rights and minimize the child’s interests. “Courts 
 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 43.  
 107.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000). 
 108.  See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 269 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the presumption is inappropriate where the parent’s and the child’s interests conflict). 
 109.  Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2006).   
 110.  Id. at 897. 
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routinely deny children standing in custody cases, even though 
children’s futures are at stake. Judges place maximum emphasis on 
what is perceived fair and equitable to the parties; other issues, such as 
the child’s wishes or needs for stability, get lost.”111 When cases go to 
hearing, courts frequently refuse to hear from children as witnesses,112 
relying instead on indirect evidence offered by the parties with their 
own interests at stake in the matter.113 This is despite the fact that 
children’s wishes as to custody are considerations under the best 
interests statute and they often want to be heard.114 As appointment of 
counsel is discretionary under the UMDA, children frequently have no 
ability to assert their wishes as to custody, regardless of the requirement 
that their wishes be considered in a best interest determination, or their 
individual constitutional right to the parent-child relationship. 
B.  Inconsistent Appointment and Conflicting Roles of Children’s 
Lawyers Across Jurisdictions 
Parties (usually parents) in custody matters do not have the right to 
appointed counsel.115 This is because the state is minimally involved in 
 
 111.  See Elrod, supra note 20; see also Monroe L. Inker & Charlotte Anne Peretta, A Child’s 
Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 5 FAM. L. Q. 108, 108 (1971) (“Almost without exception, the 
right to children, as adjudicated in custody proceedings, is determined by comparing fitness of the 
contesting parents: the children are treated as secondary parties in these proceedings . . . this 
approach is opposed to increasing judicial recognition that children have rights which can no 
longer be ignored.”). 
 112.  Leahman v. Broughton, 244 S.W. 403 (Ky. 1922).  
 113.  See, e.g., Hanna v. Hanna, 894 N.E.2d 355 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (finding that minor who 
had been joined as a party defendant did not have status to invoke the continuing jurisdiction of 
the court once the parents’ actions were withdrawn). 
 114.  See Patrick Parkinson, Judy Cashmore & Judi Single, Adolescents’ Views on the Fairness 
of Parenting and Financial Arrangements, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 429 (2005) (half of adolescents 
reporting indicated they had no say and believed the arrangement entered into reflected what was 
fair to parents, not children); see also In re Trosset, 925 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Fam. Ct. 2011) (holding 
that child’s attorney had standing to file petition on child’s behalf and the child had stake in the 
outcome sufficient to confer standing upon him to file a petition to modify a visitation and custody 
order, and, by extension, for the child’s attorney to file on his behalf, based on allegations which 
related directly to the child’s desire to live with his father).  
 115.  Private custody matters are different than other types of child-related matters in that the 
state is not a party. The state action involved is not assuming a parens patriae role and taking over 
custody of the child; the state action involved is assigning custody to one parent over the other 
based on a judicial determination of the best interests of the child. See UNIFORM MARRIAGE & 
DIVORCE ACT § 403 (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 1973). In private custody matters, parents do not 
have the right to appointed counsel the way they would in child protection matters. Id. Neither 
parent has a prima facie right to custody of the child. Monroe L. Inker and Charlotte Anne 
Peretta, A Child’s Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 5 FAM. L. Q. 108 (1971). Both have the 
constitutional right to some form of the parent-child relationship so long as neither party’s rights 
have been terminated. See Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18 
(1981). While the court’s intrusion into the parent-child relationship is less than a termination of 
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custody disputes as applied to parties;116 the parties are in relatively 
equal bargaining positions; the parties have ability to represent their 
own interests or engage their own counsel if necessary; and the parties 
are able to enter into binding agreements to avoid litigation.117 Children 
do not have the automatic right to counsel either, despite the fact that 
the child’s right to family association is arguably implicated.118 The 
UMDA allows courts to appoint an “attorney to represent the interests 
of a child” in a custody or visitation matter, but does not require it.119 
States have adopted a crazy quilt of statutes, rules and court decisions 
defining the role of the child’s attorney in custody matters.120 While the 
right to representation in custody matters is now often addressed by 
statute, what the lawyer is supposed to do is often ill-defined, even 
today.121 Courts are not frequently asked to define or explain the role 
of counsel for children in family matters, and, when courts have done 
so, they have provided no consensus.122 
When advocates are appointed for children in custody matters, they 
generally serve in one of two roles: Guardian Ad Litem (GAL)123 or 
 
parental rights proceeding, many of the same constitutional issues are implicated, and the trial 
court’s determination of best interests and assignment of custody can impose significant 
restrictions on parent-child relationships. Id. at 20. Still, because the parents are individually 
asserting rights, and the state’s involvement in the matter is considered minimally intrusive as 
applied to parents. parties are not entitled to appointed counsel in custody matters (although they 
are frequently represented by private counsel). See id.  
 116.  See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 117.  Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in 
Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 757 n.122 (1988) (“[The] goal is to divert 
families from continued litigation, to help them resolve the current issues of dispute by agreement, 
and to assist them in establishing a more successful way of resolving future disagreements.”). 
 118.  See GUGGENHEIM supra note 43, at 246 (noting that commentators argue that children’s 
claims of the right to family association should not be constitutionally protected because they 
over-empower children and destroy the fabric of the family by promoting side-taking). 
 119.  See UNIFORM MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 1973).  
 120.  Id. § 402. 
 121.  Id.  
 122.  Recently, however, the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed this issue. In Morgan v. 
Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94 (Ky. 2014), the court addressed the issue of the proper role of children’s 
counsel in custody proceedings. In the trial court, the GAL had been allowed to provide a 
recommendation report to the court, but was not subject to cross examination. Id. at 96. The 
parent’s attorney objected, claiming a procedural due process violation. Id. at 97. The Kentucky 
Supreme Court addressed the conflict between procedural due process and the GAL’s 
professional responsibility obligations. Id. at 99. The Court indicated that, in Kentucky, the 
proper role of a children’s attorney is a best interests attorney who does not provide reports to 
the court or make recommendations and is not subject to cross examination. Id. at 103. 
 123.  See Guardian Ad Litem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th Ed. 2014) (defining 
Guardian Ad Litem as the party the court deems responsible for an incapacitated, handicapped, 
or minor in court).  
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some form of attorney for the child.124 A GAL is obligated to advance 
the best interests of the child within the case.125 In some jurisdictions, 
the GAL must be an attorney,126 and in others he or she is not.127 In 
some jurisdictions, the GAL must make reports and recommendations 
to the Court,128 and in others he or she must not.129 An attorney for the 
child must advance the child’s interests, sometimes framed as the child’s 
“best interests”130 and sometimes as the child’s expressed wishes.131 
Both types of attorneys must serve in attorney roles, but their roles and 
obligations to their clients deviate greatly in terms of allocation of 
authority between attorney and client,132 the duty of confidentiality,133 
and other professional responsibility concerns. 
Most often in custody matters, the child is appointed a GAL who 
may or may not be an attorney, who is not required to follow the child’s 
 
 124. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.89(4) (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-601, 7B-1108, 
and 7B-1200 (2011); Tenn. S. Ct. R. 40A § 1(c)(1) (provisional) (allowing the guardian ad litem 
to be an attorney or a specially trained non-lawyer such as the Court-Appointed Special 
Advocates (CASA)); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.407 (2008) (“The court shall appoint a guardian ad 
litem for a minor child in any action affecting the family . . .”); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 26.10.070 (1989) (“The court may appoint an attorney to represent the interests of a minor or 
dependent child with respect to custody, support, and visitation.”). 
 125.  See Elrod, supra note 20. 
 126.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.24.310 (West 1998). 
 127.  See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS (1990) § 25-4-45.4. 
 128.  See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-205; In re Marriage of Hammill, 225 Mont. 263 
(1987); Jacobsen v. Thomas, 323 Mont. 183 (2004).  
 129.  See, e.g., State ex rel. A.D., 6 P.3d 1137 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (GALs may not be 
compelled to testify and may not be called as expert witnesses based on fulfilling statutory duties 
to make best interests recommendations.) 
 130. See Roussel v. State, 274 A.2d 909, 926 (Me. 1971) (The best interest of the child 
standard has been largely influenced by the common law doctrine of parens patriae, which holds 
that the state has the right and duty to control the custody of a minor child as it deems appropriate 
for the child’s welfare, once the child has become a subject of the jurisdiction of a court). 
 131.  See Ziehm v. Ziehm, 433 A.2d 725, 728 (Me. 1981) (quoting Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 
624, 626 (1925)) (“[The trial judge] acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of the 
child. He is to put himself in the position of a ‘wise, affectionate, and careful parent’ and make 
provision for the child accordingly. . . . He is not adjudicating a controversy between adversary 
parties, to compose their private differences. He is not determining rights ‘as between a parent 
and a child’ or as between one parent and another. He ‘interferes for the protection of 
infants, qua infants, by virtue of the prerogative which belongs to the [state] as parens patriae.’”). 
 132.  See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19. 
 133.  Id. 
HALBROOK FINAL WORD4 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2017  1:58 PM 
2017] CUSTODY: KIDS, COUNSEL AND THE CONSTITUTION 197 
direction.134 About half of states employ GALs,135 who generally 
conduct investigations, make recommendations, provide a report to the 
court, and may be called as a witness.136 In some jurisdictions, the GAL 
does not provide a report to the court but instead brings in evidence to 
advance the child’s best interests.137 This role has also been referred to 
as a child representative138 or best interests attorney139 in other 
jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, the court also has the option of 
appointing a child’s attorney – sometimes referred to as counsel or an 
expressed wishes attorney – in custody matters.140 This person argues 
for the child’s wishes, similar to the way an attorney would with an adult 
client.141 
 
 
 134.  See, e.g., K.L.R. v. L.C.R., 854 So.2d 124, 130 (Ala. Civ. App 2003); D.E.S. v. J.S., 603 
So.2d 1064 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (both stating that GAL appointment in child custody is not 
required and the child protection statute does not apply); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.24.310 (1998) 
(GAL, who may be but is not required to be, an attorney, represents the child’s best interests); 
AZ. STAT. RFLP R. 10 (GAL must determine the child’s best interests, and if the child’s wishes 
differ from the GAL’s best interests determination, must communicate the child’s wishes to the 
court along with the best interest recommendations); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/506 (2015) 
(GAL provides recommendations in the child’s best interests). 
 135.  See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S 475 (1978) (noting that where the government is 
under a due process obligation to appoint an attorney with no conflict of interest and in a manner 
that structurally does not impede ability to effectively represent the client).  
 136.  See, e.g., OHIO ST. JUV P. r. 4 (2001); In re Clark, 749 N.E.2d 833, 837 (2001). 
 137.  Morgan v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94, 115–16 (Ky. 2014). 
 138.  For example, in Aksamut v. Krahn, 227 P.3d 475, 480 (Ariz. App. 2010), the court held 
that the substantive report provided by the best interest attorney (BIA) was improper because it 
was based on her own investigation. This error was prejudicial because the trial court relied on 
the BIA’s custody opinion to decide the child custody issue. Id. at 481. Thus, there are bright line 
delineations provided in the rule: a child’s attorney or BIA may act in a representative capacity 
and urge the court to reach a particular result based upon the evidence presented. Id. However, 
like any other attorney functioning in a representative capacity, the argument and positions taken 
by the attorney do not themselves constitute evidence. Id. 
 139.  States that have a best interests attorney role include Arizona, Illinois, Maryland, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, and Pennsylvania.  
 140.  See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. §§ 241, 249 (appointment in DV cases where order of protection 
is sought). See In re. Pamela N. v. Neil N., 941 N.Y.S.2d 751 (3d Dept. 2012); Arlene R. v. Wynette 
G., 37 A.2d 1044 (4th Dept. 2007); Michael H. v. April H., 394 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Fam. Ct. 2011) 
(declaring mistrial in family court where child’s lawyer advocated an outcome which contradicted 
the 14-year-old client’s wishes). But see ex rel. McDermott v. Bale, 943 N.Y.S.2d 708 (4th Dept. 
2012) (refusing to grant children in custody cases full-party status and children’s lawyers cannot 
veto parents’ settlement and force a trial). The attorney must follow the child’s directions where 
the child is competent to take a position and not at imminent risk of harm, even if the attorney 
believes the direction is not in the child’s best interests. See 22 N.Y. C.P.R. 7.2[d][2]. 
 141.  See Diane Somberg, Defining the Role of Law Guardian in New York State by Statute, 
Standards and Case Law, 19 TOURO L. REV. 529 (2002) (describing the evolution of New York’s 
law guardian role). See also Michael H. v. April H., 934 N.Y.S.2d 685 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2011) 
(finding that attorney whose closing argument directly contradicted child’s wishes in custody case 
violated statutory duty to zealously advocate for client’s wishes). 
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While children are sometimes appointed counsel in custody 
matters, it is often not clear what the lawyer is required or even allowed 
to do.142 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, discussed below, 
provide some basic guidance for lawyers representing clients with 
diminished capacity,143 but are not very directive in assisting lawyers 
representing child clients and their special developmental needs. In 
order to address these issues, beginning in the mid-1990s,144 various 
organized bar and professional organizations began promulgating 
“standards, principles, recommendations from two national 
conferences, and even a uniform law on the representation of 
children.”145 These guidance documents are similar in many accounts, 
but they are not consistent. Much of their differences have to do with 
varying positions on the proper role of the child within the litigation, 
whether the child should have independent rights to assert, and 
whether they must be asserted through counsel. 
C.  Non-Constitutional Attempts to Clarify Role of Counsel for 
Children 
The Court in Gault declined to speak to the proper role of counsel 
in family cases. Post-Gault, courts, practitioners and commentators 
scrambled to figure out their positions on the appointment and role of 
counsel in these other contexts.146 Of course, without a constitutional 
mandate, the appointment and role of counsel for children in custody 
matters varies greatly. 
 
 142.  See generally GUGGENHEIM supra note 43 (analyzing the most significant debates in the 
children’s rights movement, particularly those that treat children’s interests as antagonistic to 
those of their parents and argues that “children’s rights” can serve as a screen for the interests of 
the adults).  
 143. See MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 (1983). 
 144.  A 1995 conference titled “Ethical Issues in the Representation of Children” at Fordham 
Law School was the catalyst for much of the work that followed in attempts to establish clear and 
ethical roles for children’s attorneys. The conference generated a list of recommendations. See 
Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, 64 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (1996). The Conference reached an agreement that attorneys should be 
appointed to represent children in child protection, termination of parental rights, delinquency, 
status offense and mental health commitment matters, but did not come to an agreement about 
whether children should be appointed as a matter of course to children in custody, visitation, 
adoption and other matters. 
 145.  See Elrod, supra note 20, at 872–73 (listing current guidance). 
 146.  Some scholars believe that children should not be appointed counsel at all in custody 
matters because doing so elevates the child’s position in the litigation improperly. See 
GUGGENHEIM, supra note 43. Professor Guggenheim has also argued that children who cannot 
direct counsel should not have counsel. See Martin Guggenheim: A Paradigm for Determining the 
Role of Counsel for Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399 (1996).  
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Advocates for traditional client-directed counsel for children argue 
that allowing traditional advocacy honors children’s autonomy and 
voice.147 While children’s capacity to fully direct counsel is debated,148 
children’s rights advocates argue that almost all children have the 
ability to communicate their wishes and desires, which should be 
followed to the greatest extent possible.149 The Rules of Professional 
Conduct define the attorney-client relationship as client-directed, even 
though the client is a child, and therefore require traditional advocacy 
to the greatest extent possible.150 While the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct account for diminished capacity – and youth and 
developmental immaturity fall under that umbrella151 – many courts 
and commentators remain unconvinced that traditional attorneys 
practicing under the Rules alone can properly serve clients and the 
public interest; as such, several sets for professional standards and rules 
have evolved over time to help define what counts as competent 
representation of children in custody matters.152 
Under the rules, attorneys who represent child clients have 
traditional obligations to them, taking into account Rule 1.14.153 
Although children are considered clients with diminished capacity 
under that rule, the rules do not allow attorneys to substitute judgment 
for their clients.154 Under the rules, they are instead to maintain the 
traditional lawyer-client relationship “as far as reasonably possible,”155 
and maintain ethical duties. These duties include competence,156 
 
 147.  Katherine Hunt Federle, Lawyering in Juvenile Court: Lessons from a Civil Gideon 
Experiment, 37 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 93, 97 (2010); Elrod, supra note 20.  
 148.  Compare AAML STANDARD 2.2 (the attorney should discuss the objectives of the 
litigation with a client twelve or over), with Donald Duquette, Two Distinct Roles/Bright Line 
Test, 6 NEV. L. J. 1240 (2006) (discussing how a child age 7 has the capacity to direct counsel).  
 149.  See Federle, supra note 147, at 97; Elrod, supra note 20; Mark Henegan, What Does a 
Child’s Right to Be Heard in Legal Proceedings Really Mean? ABA Custody Standards Do Not 
Go Far Enough, 42 FAM. L. Q. 117 (2008).   
 150.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (1983) (requiring lawyers to abide by 
their clients’ decisions concerning the client’s objectives). 
 151.  See id. r. 1.14(a) (“When a client’s ability to make adequately considered decisions in 
connection with the litigation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or 
for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal lawyer-
client relationship with the client.”). 
 152.  See id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. r. 1.14(b). 
 155.  Id.  
 156.  Id. r. 1.1. 
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allocation of authority,157 diligence and zeal,158 communication,159 and 
avoidance of conflicts.160 While the comments to Rule 1.14 note that 
“maintaining the ordinary lawyer-client relationship may not be 
possible in all respects,”161 children’s opinions are entitled weight in 
proceedings affecting them.162 Under the rules, if the lawyer is required 
to take protective action in order to assist the client, the lawyer’s action 
is determined by “the client’s best interests and the goals of intruding 
into the client’s decision-making autonomy to the least extent feasible, 
maximizing client capacities and respecting the client’s family and 
social connections.”163 
Without consensus about the proper role of counsel for children in 
the custody context – or whether the Rules of Professional Conduct 
alone provide a sufficient framework for children’s attorneys – various 
professional organizations promulgated standards for attorneys 
representing children. The American Academy of Matrimonial 
Lawyers took the position, for example, that, in the event that a child 
was appointed an advocate in a custody matter, that advocate should 
always be a traditional expressed-wishes attorney.164 The ABA, on the 
other hand, took a more measured approach. 
The ABA promulgated Standards of Practice for Lawyers 
Representing Children in Custody Cases (“ABA Standards”).165 The 
ABA Standards do not take a position on the proper role of counsel 
for children’s lawyers; they simply describe the duties of such lawyers 
if they are appointed either to advance the child’s individual interests 
(“Child’s Attorney”) or best interests (“Best Interests Attorney”).166 
The Child’s Attorney is “a lawyer who provides independent legal 
counsel for a child and who owes the same duties of undivided loyalty, 
confidentiality, and competent representation that are due an adult 
 
 157.  Id. r. 1.2. 
 158.  Id.r. 1.3. 
 159.  Id. r. 1.4. 
 160.  Id. r. 3.7.  
 161.  Id. r. 1.14 cmt. 1.  
 162.  Id.  
 163.  Id. cmt. 5.  
 164.  American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Standards for Attorneys and Guardian ad 
Litem in Custody or Visitation Proceedings, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 1 (1995). 
 165.  ABA Section of Family Law, Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing Children 
in Custody Cases, 37 FAM. L. Q. 131 (2003).  
 166.  ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, at II.B.(1)–(2) (“These Standards do not use the term 
‘Guardian Ad Litem.’ The role of ‘guardian ad litem’ has become too muddled through different 
usages in different states, with varying connotations.”). 
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client.”167 The Best Interests Attorney is “a lawyer who provides 
independent legal services for the purpose of protecting a child’s best 
interests, without being bound by the child’s objectives or directives.”168 
Both attorneys are to provide traditional functions including filing 
motions and participating in hearings and trials.169 
The roles of the Child’s Attorney and the Best Interests Attorney 
deviate from there. The Child’s Attorney is required to advocate for the 
result sought by the client, so long as the client is capable of adequately 
directing counsel.170 The Child’s Attorney functions as legal counsel 
with the same ethical obligations “in all matters”171 as an adult’s 
attorney.172 If the child does not express wishes, the Child’s Attorney 
must make a good faith effort to determine the child’s wishes and, if 
the child does not want to express a position regarding a particular 
issue, the Child’s Attorney must determine and advocate for the child’s 
interests.173 
The Best Interests Attorney advocates for the child’s best 
interests.174 The Best Interests Attorney is “bound by their states’ ethics 
rules except as dictated by the absence of a traditional attorney-client 
relationship with the child and the particular requirements of their 
appointed tasks.”175 A Best Interests Attorney is subject to the rules of 
lawyer-client confidentiality, “except that the lawyer may also use the 
child’s confidences for the purposes of representation without 
disclosing them.”176 The Best Interests Attorney must conduct a 
 
 167.  Id. II.B.(1) (defining Child’s Attorney as a lawyer who provides independent legal 
counsel for a child and who owes the same duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality, and 
competent representation as are due an adult client). 
 168.  Id. II.B.(2) (defining Best Interests Attorney as a lawyer who provides independent legal 
services for the purpose of protecting a child’s best interests, without being bound by the child’s 
directives or objectives). 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. IV.C. (“The Child’s Attorney should abide by the client’s decisions about the 
objectives of the representation with respect to each issue on which the child is competent to 
direct the lawyer, and does so. The Child’s Attorney should pursue the child’s expressed 
objectives, unless the child requests otherwise, and follow the child’s direction, throughout the 
case.”). 
 171.  Id. IV.A.1. (“Child’s Attorneys are bound by their states’ ethics rules in all matters.”). 
 172.  Id. IV.A.1. cmt. (“The child is an individual with views. To ensure that the child’s 
independent voice is heard, the Child’s Attorney should advocate the child’s articulated position 
and owes traditional duties to the client, subject to rules 1.2(a) and 1.14 of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.”). 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. V.E. (“The Best Interests Attorney should conduct thorough, continuing, and 
independent investigations . . . .”). 
 175.  Id. V.A. 
 176.  Id. V.B. cmt. (“The distinction between use and disclosure means, for example, that if a 
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thorough investigation of the case.177 The Best Interests Attorney is not 
required to advocate for the child’s wishes but instead advances the 
child’s best interests as determined by the Best Interests Attorney 
based on the Best Interests factors. 
Scholars have argued against the appointment of Best Interests 
Attorneys because best interests lawyering undermines child 
autonomy, impinges on the child’s right to direct the litigation, and 
creates ethical conflicts for attorneys.178 One scholar has argued that 
best interests lawyers “conclude what is best for their clients based on 
invisible factors that have more to tell us about the values and beliefs 
of the lawyers than about what is good for children” and, in doing so, 
pose a threat to the rule of law.179 
Without consensus, and with courts adopting varying roles, the 
Standards may serve to help attorneys define their duties, but they do 
not solve the problem of proper role. A court decision based on a child’s 
constitutional rights within the custody context would fix the problem 
of inconsistent practice. While the Rules of Professional Conduct may 
already support traditional representation, the proper role of counsel 
remains unsettled. 
V.  CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR ASSERTING RIGHTS IN PRIVATE 
CUSTODY MATTERS 
Parents’ rights to the parent-child relationship cannot be infringed 
upon by the state absent a “powerful countervailing interest” in the 
child’s well-being.180 Historically, children’s rights were subsumed into 
their parents’ rights and, thus, children did not have the status to assert 
rights within the family context.181 Although children’s rights have been 
expanded in the past fifty years,182 the Supreme Court has continued to 
 
child tells the lawyer that a parent takes drugs; the lawyer may seek and present other evidence 
of the drug use, but may not reveal that the initial information came from the child.”). 
 177.  Id. V.E.. 
 178.  See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 97, at 382; Elrod, supra note 20. 
 179.  Martin Guggenheim, A Law Guardian By Any Other Name: A Critique of the Report of 
the Martimonial Commission, 27 PACE L. REV. 785, 797 (2007) (“The most serious threat to the 
rule of law posed by the assignment of counsel for children is the introduction of an adult who is 
free to advocate his or her own preferred outcome in the name of the child’s best interests.”). 
 180.  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923)) (highlighting the importance of family relationships and the essential right to “conceive 
and to raise one’s children”). 
 181.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 182.  Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
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narrowly tailor children’s rights within families.183 This is due in large 
part to constitutional challenges having been brought by adult parties 
and not children, even though the same relationships are implicated.184 
Even where challenges have been brought on behalf of children, the 
Court has balanced children’s safety and best interests, rather than 
their rights, against their parents’ rights.185 
As such, the Court has acknowledged children’s interests in family 
relationships indirectly, but it has not addressed children’s First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights in private custody matters head-on.186 
However, children have constitutional interests separate from their 
parents’ in the custody context187 and, therefore, must have the ability 
to assert those interests through client-directed counsel. 
A.  First Amendment Freedom of Association Rights 
A long line of cases acknowledge the First Amendment association 
rights within the family context.188 Cases brought to the Supreme Court 
have not been framed as asserting a child’s right to a relationship with 
their parents or family members,189 although their ability to associate is 
clearly implicated: “Freedom of association is, by definition, a two-way 
street involving more than one party; freedom to associate requires 
associating with someone else.”190 
 
 183.  In re Dependency of MSR, 271 P.3d 234, 245 (Wash. 2012), as corrected (May 8, 2012). 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  State in Interest of L.D., 92 So. 3d 454, 458 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2012). 
 186.  Melinda A. Roberts, Parent and Child in Conflict: Between Liberty and Responsibility, 
10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 485 (1996). 
 187.  At a minimum, where their interests diverge from their parents’ and they are not 
protected by either party. 
 188.  See Chesa Boudin, Children of Incarcerated Parents: The Child’s Constitutional Right to 
the Family Relationship, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 77, 108 (2011) (citing Bd. of Dirs. of 
Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987)) (“The Court has recognized that 
the freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental 
element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.”). See also Roberts v. United States, 468 U.S. 
609, 618 (1984) (“The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to 
secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly 
personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary . . . .”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 
246, 255 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between 
parent and child is constitutionally protected.”); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 
(1977) (extending constitutional protections to begetting and bearing of children); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (recognizing fundamental constitutional rights to family 
relationships); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (finding that education and 
child-rearing are protected by the Constitution). 
 189.  See Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. at 537; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609; Quilloin, 434 U.S. 
at 246; Carey, 431 U.S. at 678; Prince, 321 U.S. 158. 
 190.  Boudin, supra note 188, at 107. 
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Lower courts have assigned due process protections based on 
children’s relational rights. For example, in Webster v. Ryan,191 the New 
York court addressed the issue of the child’s right to assert independent 
relational rights – specifically the right to assert and maintain an 
established relationship with foster parents.192 The court held that the 
child had an independent right to maintain a relationship with a person 
whom the child had developed a parent-like relationship, pursuant to 
the First Amendment freedom of association guarantees from the state 
and federal constitutions, then protected by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.193 Since the child was denied a basis to 
assert the right of contact with the foster parent, which he could do with 
other family members, he was denied equal protection.194 
If the Court acknowledges that children have certain enumerated 
and unenumerated constitutionally protected rights,195 then it follows 
that one such right is the First Amendment freedom of association. The 
Court has suggested the likely possibility – and several lower courts 
have indicated directly – that a child’s unenumerated rights include the 
fundamental right to maintain a relationship with a person with whom 
the child has established a parent-child relationship.196 These rights are 
liberty interests that are also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; 
children, therefore, are entitled to due process and equal protection of 
the laws to protect these rights. As such, a child must be provided a 
process to enforce their rights against the state or a third party. In the 
custody context, the most frequent (although not the only) party is the 
parent seeking custody or visitation against the child’s wishes. To 
protect these liberty interests against the interests of the parties in a 
custody matter, and to ensure that the child is provided due process and 
equal protection under the law, an attorney must assert these rights on 
the child’s behalf. 
B.  Fourteenth Amendment Right to Family Integrity 
Beyond First Amendment rights, family members have a due 
process liberty interest in maintaining family integrity that deserves 
protections.197 Several Supreme Court cases implicate a child’s right to 
 
 191.  729 N.Y.S.2d 315 (2001). 
 192.  Id. at 331 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. at 333. 
 195.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 196.  Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 197.  See, e.g., Kevin B. Frankel, The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Right to Family 
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family integrity, in particular Moore v. City of Cleveland,198 Smith v. 
Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform,199 Santosky v. 
Kramer,200 Michael H. v. Gerald D.,201 and Troxel v. Granville.202 
In Moore, the Court invalidated a zoning ordinance that prohibited 
extended family members from living in the same residence.203 In its 
opinion, the majority held that the ordinance violated due process. 204 
And the concurrence noted that “if any freedom not specifically 
mentioned in the Bill of Rights enjoys a ‘preferred position’ in the law 
it is most certainly the family.”205 This expanded due process 
protections to extended family members, which were previously only 
afforded to parents within the parent-child relationship.206 
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform 
addressed children’s rights directly. The Court considered the 
government’s right to remove children from foster placement where 
they had been living for more than a year.207 At issue was the balance 
of foster children’s right to stay in foster placements where they had 
become settled against parent’s right to reconciliation.208 While the 
Court held that the children’s removal did not violate the foster 
children’s or foster families’ due process rights, it recognized the 
“importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved.”209 
This relationship derives from “the intimacy of daily association.”210 
The Court further explored family integrity in Santosky v. Kramer. 
The case addressed the standard of proof required to demonstrate 
 
Integrity Applied to Custody Cases Involving Extended Family Members, 40 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 301-02, 310 (2007).   
 198.  431 U.S. 494 (1977).   
 199.  431 U.S. 816, (1977). 
 200.  455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 201.  491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 202.  530 U.S. 57 (2001). 
 203.  Moore, 431 U.S. at 494.   
 204.  Id. 
 205.  See id. at 511 (Brennan, J. concurring). 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977). 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  See id. (holding that removal procedures under which foster parents were given ten days’ 
advanced notice of removal, were permitted to request a pre-removal conference with the social 
services department, and were entitled to full adversary administrative hearing, subject to judicial 
review, following the conference with no stay of removal pending the hearing and judicial review, 
and under which pre-removal judicial review was provided with respect to children who have been 
in foster care for 18 months or more afforded sufficient due process protection to any liberty 
interests involved).  
 210.  Id. 
HALBROOK FINAL WORD4 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2017  1:58 PM 
206 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 12:2 
parental unfitness in order to remove children from the home. The 
Court balanced the state’s interest “in preserving and promoting the 
welfare of the child and a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing 
the cost and burden of such proceedings” and the parents’ interest in 
maintaining family integrity.211 Specifically, Santosky expanded the 
right to family integrity to children. 
The Court spoke to children’s interests again in Michael by 
examining the constitutionality of a statute that provided an 
irrebuttable presumption that a child born to a married woman was 
presumed to be a child of the marriage.212 The genetic father and the 
child filed equal protection challenges.213 The child alleged that she was 
denied equal protection because the mother and her husband could 
challenge the presumption, but she could not. 214 The genetic father’s 
petition was denied, and the presumption was upheld, with the court 
stating: 
The legal issue in the present case is whether the relationship 
between [the genetic father and the child] has been treated as a 
protected family unit under the historic practices of our society, or 
whether on any other basis it has been accorded special protection. 
We think it impossible to find that it has.215 
In dismissing the child’s equal protection claim, the Court noted, “We 
have never had occasion to decide whether a child has a liberty interest, 
symmetrical with that of her parent in maintaining her filial 
relationship.”216 But the dissent also discussed the relationship at issue 
being between Michael H and the child,217 noting that a parent could 
only represent a child’s interest in a custody matter if the parent’s and 
the child’s interests were aligned.218 Of course, this is not always true.  
 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S 110, 113 (1989).  
 213.  Id. at 119. 
 214.  Id. at 121. 
 215.  Id. at 124. 
 216.  Id. at 130. It is important to note that the dissenters in Michael and Lehr recognized that 
the parent’s rights protected the child’s rights only when they did not conflict. See id. at 136 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, 268 (White, J., dissenting) (1983). The 
majorities did not consider the children’s rights or allow their voice in the outcome. See Michael, 
491 U.S. at 128; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266 (holding that where the putative father had never established 
a substantial relationship with his child, the failure to give him notice of pending adoption 
proceedings, despite the state’s actual notice of his whereabouts, did not deny the putative father 
due process or equal protection since he could have guaranteed that he would receive notice of 
any adoption proceedings by mailing a postcard to the putative father registry). 
 217.  See Michael, 491 U.S. at 113–15 (citing the dissent’s discussion of facts). 
 218.  Id. 
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Most recently, in Troxel v. Granville, a private custody case, the 
Court acknowledged the parent’s right to the parent-child 
relationship,219 holding that a fit parent is presumed to act in the child’s 
best interests220 and a state court cannot force a fit parent to allow third-
party visitation.221 In Troxel, a mother sought to limit the visitation 
privileges of paternal grandparents who had sought visitation under a 
statute that allowed “any person” to petition the court for child 
visitation if it was in the best interests of the child.222 The trial court 
agreed with the grandparents and ordered the mother to allow the 
grandmother visitation.223 The Washington Supreme Court overturned 
the decision, and invalidated the statute.224 The United States Supreme 
Court affirmed the Washington State Supreme Court, holding that the 
statute infringed on the mother’s fundamental due process right to 
make decisions regarding the care and upbringing of her children.225 
Troxel speaks directly to the issue of the child’s rights within the 
private custody context. In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated: 
Cases like this do not present a bipolar struggle between the parents 
and the State over who has final authority to determine what is in 
the child’s best interests. There is at a minimum a third individual, 
whose interests are implicated in every [custody/visitation] case . . . 
the child. . . . While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate 
the nature of a child’s liberty interests in preserving established 
familial or family-like bonds, it seems to me extremely likely that, to 
the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests 
in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have 
these interests and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the 
equation.226 
While Justice Stevens’s dissent in Troxel is the most direct, Justice 
Scalia noted in his dissent that the mother asserted “only, on her own 
behalf, a substantive due process right to direct the upbringing of her 
own children, and is not asserting, on behalf of her children, their First 
Amendment rights of association . . . .”227 Justice Scalia’s comments 
 
 219.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2001).  
 220.  Id.  
 221.  Id. at 75. 
 222.  Id. at 60–61.  
 223.  Id. at 61.  
 224.  Id. at 62.  
 225.  Id. at 63.  
 226.  Id. at 86–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 227.  Id. at 93 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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imply that children have relational rights that may be asserted, and 
protections that may be guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Taken together, it can be argued that these cases demonstrate the 
Court’s recognition that children have constitutional rights that may be 
asserted in the family context and a related basis for a child to assert 
such an interest on his or her own behalf. Several lower courts have 
found this to be the case.228 Unlike the Supreme Court, some lower 
courts have more directly addressed the child’s First Amendment right 
to family integrity. For example, in Duchesne v. Sugarman,229 the Second 
Circuit addressed the issue of whether a mother was deprived her 
liberty interest in family integrity230 without necessary due process of 
law when her child was placed with third parties.231 While the case 
concerned the mother’s constitutional rights directly, the Second 
Circuit spoke of children’s rights in the family context.232 In describing 
the First Amendment right to family integrity, the court addressed both 
the parent’s and the child’s interests, stating: 
[The] right to the preservation of the family integrity encompasses 
the reciprocal rights of both parents and children. It is the interest 
in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her 
children, and of the children in not being dislocated from the 
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily 
associations with the parent.233 
The Seventh Circuit also addressed the issue of children’s First 
Amendment right to family integrity. In Doe v. Heck,234 the Seventh 
Circuit addressed the issue of whether child protection case workers 
violated parents’ and the child’s right to familial relations when 
caseworkers interviewed the child at school about abuse allegations 
without the parents’ or the school’s consent.235 Following the reasoning 
in Duchesne,236 the Seventh Circuit allowed the parents to bring due 
process claims based on the child’s relational rights.237 The Court held 
that caseworkers violated not only the parents’, but the child’s, 
 
 228.  See, e.g., K.J. ex rel. Lowry v. Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 363 F. Supp. 2d 728, 747 
(D.N.J. 2005). 
 229.  566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 230.  Id. at 824. 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  See id. at 825. 
 233.  Id. (citations omitted).  
 234.  327 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 235.  Id. at 499. 
 236.  Id. at 524. 
 237.  Id. 
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relational rights by threatening removal of the child without reasonable 
grounds to believe the child was being abused.238 
C.  Fourteenth Amendment Right to Procedural Due Process in Child 
Protection Matters 
Parents are entitled to some semblance of procedural due process 
when their right to the parent-child relationship is challenged by the 
state.239 In child protection proceedings, “[t]he state is the petitioner, 
the parents are the respondents, and the child’s welfare is the subject of 
the proceeding . . . The purpose of the proceeding is to determine, first, 
if the child is abused or neglected and, if so, what action should be taken 
and where the child should be placed.” 240 
Counsel is frequently associated with notions of procedural due 
process. Parents in the abuse, neglect and dependency realm are not 
provided appointed counsel in every case. 241 The right to counsel in this 
context is most frequently rooted in the parent’s right to procedural 
due process. The United States Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge 
articulated a three-part balancing test to determine what process is due 
when the state interferes with individual rights.242 To determine what 
process is due, the Court applies a three-part balancing test: (1) the 
private interests affected; (2) the state’s interests, including the fiscal 
and administrative burdens imposed by the process; and (3) the risk of 
an erroneous decision if procedural safeguards are not provided, and 
the likelihood that the safeguards will ameliorate the risk.243 In Lassiter 
v. Department of Social Services, the Court has applied this test in the 
dependency context244 with regard to counsel for parents. 
In Lassiter, the Court examined a procedure that failed to provide 
an indigent parent with an attorney in a termination of parental rights 
 
 238.  See id. (citations and question marks omitted) (“The interest being protected is not only 
that of the parent in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children, 
[but also] of the children in not being dislocated from the emotional attachments that derive from 
the intimacy of daily association, with the parent.”). 
 239.  Suparna Malempati, Beyond Paternalism: The Role of Counsel for Children in Abuse 
and Neglect Proceedings, 11 U.N.H.L. REV. 97, 107 (2013). 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (holding that the Constitution 
does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental status 
termination proceeding). 
 242.  Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27–28. The Court also applied this standard when considering the 
burden of proof necessary to terminate parental rights. Id. 
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hearing.245 While the Court initially stated that there is a presumption 
against providing an indigent parent with counsel in a dependency case 
because indigent people are generally only provided counsel when 
their physical liberty interests are at stake, the Court acknowledged 
that a loss of parental rights is a “unique kind of deprivation.”246 When 
looking at the state’s interest, the Court found that appointment of 
counsel would promote the child’s welfare and assist in reaching an 
accurate decision.247 While appointing counsel violated the state’s 
pecuniary interest, that interest was a weak one.248 When addressing the 
risk of erroneous deprivation, the Court indicated that there were some 
circumstances where the parent’s incapacity and the complexity of the 
proceedings would make the risk insupportably high.249 On balance, 
however, the Court concluded that legal representation for indigent 
parents in termination of parental rights proceedings is not required in 
every case.250 
In spite of the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment 
protections addressed in Lassiter, most indigent parents are entitled to 
appointed counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings 
brought by the state, based on constitutional rights or statute.251 When 
an action is brought by an individual rather than the state, indigent 
parents are not typically appointed counsel.252 
Even though the Court in Lassiter refused to extend the same 
fundamental protections that would be provided to an adult in the 
criminal context, and only guaranteed the possibility of counsel for 
parents upon the balancing test delineated in Eldridge, it is important 
to note that the outcome could be different if the test were applied to 
children in child protection matters. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, 
explained indigent parents’ blanket needs and the illogic of requiring 
 
 245.  Id. at 22–23. 
 246.  Id. at 27. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  See id. (“[T]hough the State’s pecuniary interest is legitimate, it is hardly significant 
enough to overcome private interests as important as those here.”). 
 249.  Id. at 31. 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 399 N.E.2d 66, 70 (1980) (“In the absence of 
sufficient justification by the state, parents must be provided with a transcript and appointed 
counsel or they will be constitutionally deprived of their right of appeal.”).  
 252.  See, e.g., Rosewell v. Hanrahan, 523 N.E.2d 10, 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding 
respondent not entitled to free counsel in termination of parental rights matter brought by private 
individual). While one may conclude that Lassiter establishes that children—like parents—do not 
have an automatic due process right to counsel in dependency proceedings, Lassiter is 
distinguishable. For a discussion of this issue, see ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19. 
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an individualized needs assessment.253 The illogic would be exponential 
if applied to children, whose blanket needs are at least as great as an 
indigent parent. In the child protection context, children are especially 
vulnerable. The allegations relate to abuse, neglect, or dependency.254 
Children are, however, routinely treated not as parties, but as “third 
party beneficiar[ies] whose interests are subsumed by the parties’ 
positions and protected by the Court.” 255 Without the guarantee of due 
process, the child’s views are not considered equal under the law to 
parents or the state – regardless of the possibility that the child may be 
removed from the parents’ home and placed with strangers.256 While 
parents have an interest in proving fitness to the Court, and the state 
has the obligation to consider the needs of children and child wards as 
a whole, neither has the individual obligation to advocate for the child’s 
wishes. 
Although children are rights-based individuals under the 
Constitution and the Constitution’s protections are “not for adults 
alone,”257 the child is in an ineffective position to assert First 
Amendment protections through the Fourteenth Amendment. While 
“[f]reedom of association is, by definition, a two-way street”258 which 
has been protected by the due process and equal protection clauses, 
children in dependency cases need more – not less – protection than 
parents. Children face the risks to physical, emotional, educational and 
relational stability, which should not be deprived by the state without 
due process.259 Applying an Eldridge analysis to children could yield a 
different result on balance. In addition, the last Eldridge factor – the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation – would likely yield a different result. 
An erroneous decision in a dependency case could mean abuse, neglect, 
permanently severed relationships, or even death for a child. “Given 
the weight of the private interest at stake, the social cost of even an 
 
 253.  Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 35 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). 
 254.  In 1974, Congress enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), 
Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974), which requires states to provide a representative to all 
children in child protection proceedings. The advocate may be an attorney or a lay advocate, but 
in either case the representative’s role is to make recommendations concerning the best interests 
of the child.  
 255.  See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) (finding that the interests of the parent 
and child are presumed aligned until there has been a finding of parental fitness).  
 256.  See LaShanda Taylor, A Lawyer for Every Child: Client-Centered Representation in 
Dependency Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 605, 614 (2009).  
 257.  In re Gault, 381 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).  
 258.  Boudin, supra note 188, at 107.  
 259.  See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).  
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occasional error is sizeable.”260 Pursuant to Santosky, the Court must 
also consider the “probably value, if any, of additional procedural 
safeguards.”261 While an adult may have an understanding of 
substantive and procedural issues, and court process, children are at 
great risk of misunderstanding both. The presence of an attorney to 
advocate for the child could significantly decrease the likelihood of 
error, thus tipping the Eldridge balancing test in favor of appointed 
counsel for children in child protection cases. This reasoning may be 
applied to the appointment of counsel for children in private custody 
matters as well. 
Having acknowledged that children may have relational rights to 
be asserted – at least in family cases where the state is involved – many 
lower courts have held that children have the right to due process, 
including the right to effective representation.262 Many states have 
adopted statutes that specifically assign counsel to children in family 
matters to ensure due process, although the statutes sometimes but not 
always speak to the basis for the assignment.263 
Another court concluded that children have the right to client-
directed counsel in dependency proceedings on procedural due process 
grounds.264 In Kenny A. ex rel Winn v. Purdue, a group of children who 
had been removed from their homes and placed in foster care alleged 
that the state had provided them with ineffective counsel in 
dependency hearings.265 The District Court for the Northern District of 
Georgia held that children in dependency hearings have fundamental 
interests at stake, including “safety, health, and well-being, as well as an 
interest in maintaining the integrity of the family unit and having a 
relationship with his or her family unit.”266 Having made the conclusion 
that children have fundamental interests at stake, the court assessed 
what process was due under the Georgia Constitution.267 The court held 
that there were private liberty interests in safety, health and wellbeing 
and that children had an interest in not being placed in state custody.268 
The court noted that the risk of an erroneous decision was 
 
 260.  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762.  
 261.  Id. 
 262.  See, e.g., In re Jamie TT, 599 NYS 2d 892 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
 263.  See, e.g., New Mexico ex rel CYFD v. John R., 203 P.3d 167 (N.M. App. 2009) (holding 
that a New Mexico statute requires counsel for children 14 and up).  
 264.  See Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2005). 
 265.  Id. at 1355. 
 266.  Id. at 1360. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  Id. at 1361. 
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unacceptably high, citing routine errors made by the state and reviewed 
procedural safeguards that could protect children, including citizen 
review boards, court-appointed special advocates, and the judge.269 
Having considered these options, the court concluded that only client-
directed counsel could adequately protect children in dependency 
proceedings.270 Moreover, the court indicated that the state’s interest is 
to ensure the child’s best interest is protected, and, therefore, the state’s 
interest is protected when the child is protected by counsel.271 
VI.  CHILDREN’S RIGHTS REQUIRE TRADITIONAL ADVOCACY IN 
CUSTODY MATTERS 
Parents have the fundamental right to family association, including 
freedom of choice in family matters where health and safety are at 
stake. The fundamental parent-child relationship is also at stake for the 
child, yet the child is often left without the ability to assert his or her 
interests. Children should not be required to rely on parents to protect 
their constitutional interests in custody matters; instead, children 
should be provided not just counsel but traditional client-directed 
counsel. Schemes requiring an attorney for the child to substitute 
judgment for the child’s or pursue a legal outcome against the child’s 
wishes is both unconstitutional and in violation of the attorney’s ethical 
obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Parents in private custody matters are not assigned counsel. While 
they may be provided counsel in abuse, neglect and dependency 
proceedings at the point where the Eldridge test balances in their 
favor,272 the appointment is not automatic even when the state is 
involved in the case. Parents are generally presumed competent to 
assert their rights and interests in private custody matters, including 
bringing and withdrawing custody actions, participating in hearings and 
trials, and coming to binding agreements.273 
While parties to custody matters do not have the automatic right to 
counsel, children have a stronger basis for the right. Some would argue 
 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).  
 273.  See, e.g., Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal 
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 757 n.122 (1988) (“The goal 
[of child custody mediation] is to shift the group from its preoccupation with negatives to a 
rediscovery of positives, from incompetency to themes of competency, and from conflict to 
cooperation.”). 
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that children’s interests are protected by parents’ interests and the best 
interests factors; children’s rights, however, frequently conflict with 
parents’ rights in custody and visitation matters.274 Parents often have 
personal and legal interests of their own, which they are free to pursue, 
with client-directed counsel or without counsel. They do not have an 
obligation to advocate for the child’s wishes. Because children do not 
typically have party status,275 they are often not heard, despite the fact 
that their wishes are one of the factors the court is to consider in the 
best interests context.276 A child’s desires may be manipulated by the 
parties and may not be in the child’s best interests.277 Without counsel, 
the parties dominate the process and the child’s interests do not get an 
equal share of consideration; if the constitutional interests in the 
parent-child relationship are equal, then children’s wishes should get 
equal weight asserted through independent counsel. 
The right to be heard “before being condemned to suffer grievous 
loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and 
hardship of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.”278 
Children are, however, uniquely situated in a worse position than the 
parents – their liberty interests in familial relationships and sometimes 
 
 274.  See discussion supra Part V.C. 
 275.  There is a lack of consistency in whether children are treated as parties. Wisconsin, for 
example, mandates that the child’s best interest be the “party” and that the attorney-guardian ad 
litem act in the “same manner as an attorney for a party to the action.” WISC. STAT. ANN. § 
767.407(4) (2008). Ohio and Texas allow the court discretion as to whether to make children 
parties. See Ohio Civ. R. Rule 75(B)(2) (“When it is essential to protect the interests of a child, 
the court may join the child as a party defendant and appoint a guardian ad litem and legal 
counsel, if necessary, and tax the costs.”); cf. Hanna v. Hanna, 894 N.E.2d 355 (Ohio App. 2008) 
(holding that parents were the only parties who could invoke the court’s continuing jurisdiction 
to modify a custody decree and the minor’s party status is contingent upon the parents bringing 
or maintaining the action). See also 39 TEX. JUR. 3D FAMILY LAW § 426 (“The district court may, 
on its own motion, make the parties’ minor children parties to divorce and custody proceedings 
if it determines, in its discretion, that it is just and proper to do so, and may appoint a guardian ad 
litem to represent the interests of the children.”); Peterson v. Peterson, 502 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. 
App. 1973) (holding that district court was empowered on its own motion to make children the 
parties to the divorce action and that it was just and proper to do so). 
 276.  Party status allows for access to justice, notice, the right to be heard and to participate 
in the proceeding. At a time when the child’s liberty interests are at stake – including the 
possibility of a physical move and restriction on the parent-child relationship – it protects 
children’s rights. And best interests. Without party status, they are not entitled to notice, 
participation, or voice. Discretionary appointment of counsel creates disparate outcomes – so that 
some children are treated as parties and some are not. In addition, children may be subject to 
sanctions of the court without being guaranteed the protection of counsel. See, e.g., Eibschitz-
Tsimhoni v. Tsimhoni, No. 329406, 2016 WL 1533598, at *1 (Mich. App. Apr. 14, 2016). 
 277.  See Nehra v. Uhlar, 372 N.E.2d 4, 7 (1977). 
 278.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee 
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 121–72 (1951)).  
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physical liberty is at stake but they often do not have the ability to 
assert their expressed interests or ability to hire their own lawyers. They 
are frequently not heard, or not heard adequately, despite the fact that 
the law says a state cannot wholly infringe on a minor’s fundamental 
rights without an opportunity for the child to present her case to the 
court.279 
While children are protected by the same constitutional guarantees 
as adults against governmental deprivation, the state is allowed to 
adjust the legal system to account for children’s vulnerability and need 
for “concern, sympathy, and paternal attention.” The Best Interests 
framework – and its provisions for the discretionary appointment of a 
best interests advocate for children – is an attempt to make this 
adjustment. It is, however, inadequate. It is based on the inaccurate 
presumption that parents will protect children’s interests. While the 
best interest standard is minimally invasive as applied to parents, 
because parents have personal and legal autonomy within the 
proceedings, it is not the same for children. For children, a best interest 
determination can have the same effect as a termination of parental 
rights hearing. When one parent receives primary custody, the child 
may lose contact and support from the non-custodial parent.280 If the 
child is unable to assert his or her rights, the child must rely on the 
custodial parent to bring a motion to address visitation.281 If the 
custodial parent is unwilling to do so, the child is left without recourse; 
the child is unable to bring the motion unless he or she has counsel.282 
Moreover, if the child is appointed counsel who advocates against what 
the child wishes, the child is denied due process. 
Without safeguards that allow for traditional representation, the 
child’s interests are not likely to be represented and the child is not 
likely to be heard. Schemes that provide children with an advocate who 
is not required to follow the client’s wishes deny advocacy efforts on 
the child’s behalf. While it would be a constitutional and ethical 
violation to appoint counsel to parents to argue against their wishes in 
private custody matters, that is exactly what is permissible with regard 
to children under many best interests schemes.283 In addition, child 
 
 279.  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).  
 280.  Lemcke v. Lemcke, 623 N.W.2d 916, 919 (Minn. App. 2001). 
 281.  See In re Iris M., 703 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Md. Spec. App. 1998). 
 282.  GUGGENHEIM, supra note 43. 
 283.  See, e,g., IOWA CODE § 598.12 (2005) (GAL shall investigate and represent the child’s 
best interests, and inform the court if the child’s wishes do not align with the GAL’s 
recommendations). 
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advocates who provide reports and testify and have no attorney-client 
privilege with the child, are in a position to deny the child the right to 
discovery, protective orders, motions, persuasive writing and expressed-
wishes participation in hearings and trial. The due process violation is 
worst in situations where the advocate is allowed to argue against the 
child’s wishes, and the child has no way to express his or her wishes or 
confront the GAL who has become the child’s adversary.284 
In Gault, the Supreme Court made it clear that children are allowed 
counsel in delinquency cases because their physical liberty interests are 
at stake, but the Court has also acknowledged that there are special 
considerations in family cases – particularly where there is the 
possibility that family relationships will be terminated.285 While Gault 
is currently applied in the delinquency/criminal context, and has not yet 
been extended to family contexts, the distinction between the contexts 
should not survive. Prior to Gault, children were not afforded due 
process in any context; the court assumed a parens patriae role in 
determining the child’s and society’s needs instead of adjudicating the 
case. Gault recognized the scheme as a mechanism of convenience that 
violated the child’s due process rights. 
The requirement of due process is not limited to criminal 
proceedings. The Eldridge balancing test has been applied in the family 
law context, and some form of hearing is required before an individual 
is deprived of a liberty or property interest. In custody matters, 
however, this due process requirement is often only applied to adults 
and, in contrast, children may be absent or appointed counsel who are 
not required to assert the child’s expressed wishes. This essentially 
allows an ex parte hearing where the child is never heard or where the 
child’s position is controverted by the child’s own representative. 
Courts have found that parents have a due process right to cross 
examine guardians ad litem who have made recommendations in their 
custody cases,286 and the same should be true for the child who is in an 
even more precarious situation. If the GAL or other representative 
assigned  to  represent  the  child  takes  a  position  against the child’s  
 
 
 284.  In re Christina W., 639 S.E.2d 770, 778 (W. Va. 2006). 
 285.  See discussion supra Part I. 
 286.  See Emily Gleiss, Note, The Due Process Rights of Parents to Cross-Examine Guardians 
ad Litem in Custody Disputes: The Reality and the Ideal, 94 MINN. L. REV. 2103 (2010) (arguing 
that the inability of parents under most state laws to cross-examine GALs violates parents’ 
substantive and procedural due process). 
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expressed wishes, the child has no meaningful way to assert his or her 
protected rights or wishes. 
As discussed above, child representation does not always fit easily 
within the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, given a child’s 
potential developmental limitations.287 Still, the Model Rules account 
for capacity issues, and give lawyers the ability to seek outside 
assistance while still maintaining a traditional lawyer-client 
relationship as “far as reasonably possible.”288 While the Model Rules 
acknowledge that it may not be possible to maintain the traditional 
relationship in every respect, they remind practitioners that “children 
as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, 
are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal 
proceedings concerning their custody.”289 
When a child’s liberty interests are at stake, the court must consider 
the child’s wishes regarding the outcome of the case because they 
directly affect the child. The child’s ability to express his or her rights, 
interests, and wishes is lost without the ability to direct counsel and due 
process is impossible if the attorney can advocate against the child’s 
wishes. Allowing for anything other than traditional advocacy 
undermines both the child client and the attorney’s ethical 
responsibilities. 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS  
It is often convenient for courts to not appoint counsel for children 
or to appoint counsel not required to keep client confidences or 
advocate for the child’s wishes. These shortcuts come at the child’s 
expense, and the child is the person whose best interests are the focus 
of custody litigation. To undermine the child’s ability to assert his or 
her interests in the family context, and to disallow the child’s voice and 
direction, undermines the child’s constitutional rights as well as the 
state’s interest in promoting the child’s best interests. The child is in the 
best position to articulate his or her interests, not the parents or any 
third party without an obligation to advance the child’s interests in the 
litigation. 
In order for young people to assert their right to fundamental 
family relationships and freedom of association with their family 
 
 287.  See discussion supra Part IV.C.  
 288.  MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 (1983).  
 289.  Id. cmt. 6. 
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members, states should allow children party status in custody matters 
in order to assert their rights. This could be done by Civil Rule or 
Statute. In Ohio, Civil Rule 75 related to divorce, annulment and 
separation actions allows the court discretion to give children party 
status “[w]hen it is essential to protect the interests of a child.”290 
Commentary to the Rule recognizes that sometimes children are the 
forgotten parties to the divorce action and allows the specific right to 
appointment of counsel in order to ensure that the children’s interests 
are represented and protected when necessary.291 In Texas, the 
appointment is made based on statute,292 which allows “[t]he district 
court [to], on its own motion, make the parties’ minor children parties 
to divorce and child custody proceedings if it determines, in its 
discretion, that it is just and proper to do so, and may appoint a 
guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the children.”293 
Courts and practitioners may be uncomfortable with client-directed 
attorneys for children in some contexts. The ABA standards allow for 
the appointment of a best interests attorney instead of a traditional 
attorney as a kind of a compromise in this area. In the event that a best 
interests attorney is appointed, that attorney should act like any other 
attorney on the case in terms of duties. The attorney should not advance 
a position against the client’s wishes without the possibility of cross 
examination.   
If a GAL or investigator is appointed, it should be clear that a GAL 
is serving in a witness role and making a report to the Court; that 
person’s files should be open to investigation and that person should 
be subject to cross-examination. Preventing the GAL practice of 
reporting to the court without being subject to cross examination will 
help ensure that the parents’ due process rights, as well as the child’s, 
are not compromised. 
In any case where a traditional child’s attorney is appointed, that 
attorney’s role should be clearly delineated and the responsibilities 
clearly articulated. The ABA Standards for Representing Children in 
Custody Cases include a Model Child Representative Appointment 
Order and Order for Access to Confidential Information.294 These may 
be used as a starting point, but jurisdictions should also articulate 
 
 290.  OHIO CIV. R. r. 75(B)(2). 
 291.  Id. 
 292.  39 TEX. JUR. 3D FAMILY LAW §426. 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  See ABA Section of Family Law, supra note 165.  
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exactly what tasks a child’s attorney is expected to complete within the 
litigation. 
While child custody proceedings often focus on balancing the 
parents’ competing interests in the child, process should focus on 
ensuring that the child’s wishes and the best interests factors are 
considered by the court. Allowing for client-directed counsel 
participating in every aspect of the proceeding, including discovery, 
motion practice, filing pre-trial memoranda, calling witnesses, and 
participating in appeals, will allow for more robust consideration of the 
child’s best interests while taking the child’s liberty interests into 
consideration. 
Finally, children’s attorneys in the custody context should be 
required to strictly adhere to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
promoting uniformity of practice, preventing role confusion, and 
reducing the possibility of substitution of judgment or other ethics 
violations. Rule 1.14 allows the attorney to take protective action on 
behalf of a client if the attorney believes it to be necessary, but only 
when the client’s “capacity to make adequately considered decisions” 
is “diminished.”295 The existing professional responsibility framework 
already accounts for clients’ developmental status in that it 
acknowledges that “maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer 
relationship may not be possible in all respects,”296 allows the lawyer to 
reveal client confidences in order to seek assistance from third 
parties.297 In doing so, it promotes consistency of role and allows for due 
process.   
CONCLUSION 
Fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court in In re Gault held 
that children have the right to traditional client-directed counsel in 
cases where their physical liberty interests are at stake. As a result, 
children are provided counsel during the adjudication phase of 
delinquency proceedings in order to ensure protection of their rights. 
Gault did not, however, extend the automatic right to counsel to other 
contexts in which children most frequently appear in court: family 
cases. 
The right to traditional counsel afforded to children in Gault should 
be extended to the child custody context. While physical liberty 
 
 295.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 (1983). 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  Id.  
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interests are not typically at stake in custody matters, other serious 
interests – including the right to familial relationships and freedom of 
association – are at stake, which require due process protections. When 
non-traditional child advocates are appointed to custody cases, and 
allowed to report to the court without having to follow the client’s 
directions and without being subject to cross examination, due process 
rights – and related fundamental interests – are compromised. 
Traditional advocacy by attorneys in custody matters protect children’s 
constitutional rights while ensuring ethical advocacy by children’s 
attorneys. 
